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MANAGING A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP MODEL: 
LESSONS FROM THE BOEING 787 “DREAMLINER” PROGRAM 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Understanding how to effectively integrate knowledge among the subsidiaries of an MNE is one 
of the most important research areas in global strategy. However, little research has examined the 
integration challenges in globally disaggregated value-chains in a complex NPD effort involving 
cutting-edge technologies or the tools managers use to overcome these challenges. Using an in-
depth longitudinal study of the Boeing 787 program, we highlight three distinct integration 
challenges Boeing faced pertaining to design integration, production integration, and supply-
chain integration. It addressed these integration challenges through recourse to partial 
collocation, establishing a unique IT-enabled centralized integration support center, reintegrating 
some activities previously performed by suppliers, and using its bargaining power to facilitate 
changes. We found that the integration tools employed were geared toward two primary 
objectives: (1) gaining increased visibility of actions, and visibility of knowledge networks 
across partner firms; and (2) motivating partners to take actions that would improve such 
visibility. These findings add a level of empirical traction to the theoretical debate around the 
integration tools and the role of authority in the knowledge-based view of the firm.  
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MANAGING A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP MODEL: 
LESSONS FROM THE BOEING 787 “DREAMLINER” PROGRAM 
 
INTRODUCTION 
How do firms integrate knowledge in a globally distributed new product development (NPD) 
effort involving cutting-edge technology? Addressing this question is important because value 
chains in numerous industries have become increasingly globally disaggregated (Mudambi & 
Venzin, 2010). Also, firms are locating NPD and R&D activity in offshore locations to leverage 
knowledge and talent (Lewin, Massini, & Peeters, 2009; Thursby & Thursby, 2006). Such trends 
have increased the importance of integrating globally sourced external knowledge with internal 
firm knowledge and capabilities.  
The importance of integrating is especially true for firms engaged in strategic NPD 
activities that often rely on external sources such as suppliers and customers for specialized 
knowledge. With increasing complexity, rapid technological advance, and widely dispersed 
knowledge and expertise, it is difficult for any single firm to internally assemble the knowledge 
needed for complex NPD projects. Instead, firms must depend on external innovation partners to 
build products within acceptable budgets, timelines, and financial risk (Chesbrough, 2003; 
Madhok, 1997; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). Typically, in order to develop high value 
products or services, firms must acquire external knowledge and effectively integrate it with 
internal knowledge (Becker & Zirpoli, 2011; Dyer & Hatch, 2006; Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006).  
Past research has shown that integrating knowledge across geographies can be difficult 
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Meyer, Mudambi, & Narula, 2011; Mudambi, 2011), especially from 
foreign suppliers and alliance partners (Almeida, Song, & Grant, 2002). This is because tools 
such as normative integration, social integration, and authority relationships (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 
1989; Martinez & Jarillo, 1989; Mudambi, 2011; Rugman & Verbeke, 2009) used by the multi-
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national enterprise (MNE) to integrate activities across geographies are unavailable in globally 
disaggregated buyer-supplier supply chains (Rugman, Verbeke, & Nguyen, 2011).1 Although 
(partial) collocation or significant travel across the globe is theoretically feasible it is 
prohibitively expensive in practice, forcing firms to consider alternatives. As well, the need for 
specialized external sources of knowledge may require a buyer to work with suppliers with the 
requisite knowledge but no prior relationship.  
Understanding how to effectively integrate knowledge among the subsidiaries of an MNE 
is one of the most important research areas in global strategy (Kogut & Zander, 1993; Mudambi, 
2011). However, little research has examined the integration challenges in globally 
disaggregated value-chains in a complex NPD effort involving cutting-edge technologies or the 
tools used by managers to overcome these challenges. This study attempts to address this gap by 
exploring the question: How does a firm integrate globally disaggregated new product 
development and manufacturing?  To address this, we identify the components, tools, and 
mechanisms that underlie global integration capability. 
Since the research question addresses issues pertaining to a globally disaggregated 
complex NPD initiative, we chose a setting in which such processes are still unfolding. To this 
end, we examine Boeing’s 787 “Dreamliner” program. The 787-airplane is a breakthrough 
product involving cutting-edge technologies, which required a significant integration effort 
between suppliers and Boeing locations across the globe. The 787-airplane would be considered 
a breakthrough product because it is the first passenger plane built using composite materials, 
which pushed the technological frontier in terms of flying a certain distance with 20 percent 
lower fuel than comparable planes.  

1Normative integration provides benefits such as a common language and agreed upon decision rules (Ghoshal & 
Nohria, 1989), whereas social integration enables the transfer of sticky knowledge through strong ties (Frost & 
Zhou, 2005; Hansen, 1999, 2002). 
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We undertook a qualitative study of this globally distributed, complex NPD project 
because the introduction of a new airplane provided the ideal context for examining issues in 
global-supplier integration. We explore the different types of integration challenges faced by 
Boeing in the 787-program, and observe how these issues were resolved in order to uncover the 
building blocks of a global-integration capability. Integration in this context takes place in an 
unstructured setting laden with ambiguity, which makes it difficult to specify interdependencies 
across firms and geographic boundaries a priori. In addition to the role played by traditional 
mechanisms that drive integration, the chosen context allows for other potentially interesting 
mechanisms to be identified and discussed. This is best accomplished using a qualitative 
approach (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).  
Our findings suggest that Boeing encountered three kinds of integration problems in 
implementing the 787-airplane program. It achieved integration through recourse to partial 
collocation, established a unique IT-enabled centralized integration support center, reintegrated 
some activities previously performed by suppliers, and used its bargaining power to facilitate 
integration. We found that the integration tools employed were geared toward two primary 
objectives: (1) gaining increased visibility of actions, and visibility of knowledge networks 
across partner firms; and (2) motivating partners to take actions that would improve visibility. 
These findings both contribute to our understanding of the components of a global integration 
capability and add a level of empirical traction to the largely theoretical debate around the role of 
authority in the knowledge-based view of the firm.  
 
Background Literature 
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An extensive amount of international business research has considered the difficulty in 
integrating knowledge across locations within an MNE (Mudambi, 2011; Rugman & Verbeke, 
2009; Rugman, Verbeke, & Nguyen, 2011). In contrast, we focus specifically on knowledge 
integration across geographically distributed buyers and suppliers involved with complex NPD 
programs in a global setting. In general, integrating knowledge-intensive activities between firms 
is more difficult than within a single firm because personnel from different firms lack a: (1) 
common language, common culture, or agreed upon decision principles that arise naturally 
within firms (Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992, 1996); and (2) unified source of authority to 
enforce decisions or break deadlocks that arise from conflicts (Williamson, 1985).  
Prior work suggests that buyer-supplier relationships achieve knowledge integration by 
broadly relying on three sets of tools: (1) collocating buyer and supplier engineers (Dyer, 1997; 
Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Helper, MacDuffie, & Sabel, 2000); (2) leveraging relationship-specific 
assets (RSA) developed in prior interactions (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Kale & Singh, 2007); and (3) 
using modular product architectures (Baldwin & Clark, 2000). Such tools have significant 
shortcomings when integrating knowledge in buyer-supplier NPD relationships that are globally 
distributed as explained in greater detail below.  
Collocation and Integration. One approach to integrating knowledge between buyer and 
supplier engineers is through collocation, at least for the critical phases of a project (Dyer, 2000; 
Lincoln & Ahmadjian, 2001; Olson & Olson, 2000). Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) have shown that 
geographic proximity is a key consideration in creating supplier groups in the Toyota network. 
Typically, Toyota has engineers from its suppliers working in its facilities for extended periods, 
and vice versa, leading to human capital co-specialization (Dyer, 1996; Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000). 
Operating within the same environment facilitates the emergence of shared contextual 
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knowledge, which in turn promotes integration (Kraut et al., 2002; Olson et al., 2002). Dyer 
(2000) shows that the average distance between Toyota’s and its supplier plants is much lower 
than the corresponding distance for GM and argues that such close physical proximity provides 
Toyota with an advantage in integrating supplier activities relative to GM for it enables rich and 
fast communications. Helper et al. (2000) argue that collocation supports monitoring and 
promotes socialization between buyer and supplier employees, leading to superior integration 
outcomes. In short, collocation facilitates effective integration.  
However, in globally distributed NPD projects, (partial) collocating supplier engineers 
and/or facilitating extensive travel across the supplier network is prohibitively expensive in 
practice, leading firms to look for alternatives to achieve integration. Also, in globally 
disaggregated projects, differences in language, culture, and institutional diversity further 
exacerbate the coordination problems that arise due to geographic distance such as the lack of 
frequent, rich situated interactions between interdependent agents.2 It is important to note that 
whereas prior work has pointed out the problems arising from geographic dispersion, it is still an 
open question as to how such relationships should be managed to achieve effective integration 
between the assembler and suppliers when collocation is constrained. 
RSA and Integration. Research suggests that when exchange partners develop RSA, or 
relational capital, they are more effective in integrating activities (Doz, 1996; Dyer & Singh, 
1998; Kotabe, Martin, & Domoto, 2003). Relationship duration influences the stock of RSA 
between partners, with the current project benefitting from learning in prior interactions. As 

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partner-specific experience and learning accumulate, they create RSA such as the development 
of a common language, interaction routines, and a better understanding of partner decision-
making procedures, leading to better knowledge exchange and superior integration (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998; Gulati et al., 2009). RSA among established partners could include aids in 
achieving integration in NPD such as boundary objects that can convey meaning across different 
functional specialists (Carlile, 2002) and the presence of boundary spanners with the recognition 
and credibility across the different units (Mudambi, 2011). 
In globally distributed NPD projects involving cutting-edge technologies, RSA may be 
unavailable or is severely constrained. First, the necessary technological know-how may only be 
available through firms that share no prior relationship (Garud & Munir, 2008). For instance, 
when electronics technology was incorporated into cars, automotive manufacturers were forced 
to seek new partners with such expertise (Lee & Berente, 2011). Second, with a prior partner, a 
qualitative change in the nature of the relationship could limit the usefulness of accumulated 
RSA in achieving integration outcomes. For example, aids in integration such as boundary 
objects may need to be renegotiated across the different experts involved and new boundary 
spanners with credibility across the new functions identified. Thus, when U.S. automakers 
adopted Japanese supply management practices (e.g., JIT and Kanban) and outsourced complete 
subsystems, both manufacturers and suppliers had to learn how to manage this transformation to 
their partnership.  
Modularity and Integration. Another important approach to integrating supplier 
knowledge is a reliance on modular product and organization architectures. Organizational 
architecture represents the division of labor between the firm and its suppliers and the integration 
mechanisms used to coordinate activities (Baldwin & Clark, 2000), whereas product architecture 
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represents a product’s de-construction into subcomponents and their interactions (Ulrich & 
Eppinger, 2005). Research has shown that when a product’s architecture and its underlying 
knowledge are modular, integrating knowledge from external sources is less difficult (Baldwin & 
Clark, 2000; Brusoni, Prencipe, & Pavitt, 2001).3 
Entirely modular product architectures are relatively rare; this is especially the case with 
complex NPD projects involving cutting-edge technologies, due to the significant uncertainty 
regarding the nature of interdependence between the subcomponents (Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004). 
In such situations, product designers often learn about component interdependences via trial and 
experimentation (Garud & Munir, 2008). In new automotive design, for example, designers 
cannot predict ex ante how components will interact to generate system performance such as 
noise or vibration (Becker & Zirpoli, 2010), a factor that constrains the designer from realizing a 
modular organizational architecture. In such settings, firms may be better off using an integral 
rather than a modular perspective (Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003). Thus, NPD efforts involving 
integral products and breakthrough innovations require significant cross-team integration across 
different components (Sosa, Eppinger, & Rowles, 2004; Zirpoli & Becker, 2011). Since 
suppliers often hold critical knowledge about subsystem designs, effective buyer and supplier 
knowledge integration is critical for breakthrough NPD projects. 
‘Insert Table 1 about here’ 
In sum, NPD programs involving cutting-edge technologies that are distributed across 
both geographic and firm boundaries present unique integration challenges. As shown in Table 1, 
integration tools designed to manage such programs are limited. Collocation can be prohibitively 

3
 With modular systems, specialist-component suppliers can focus on improving their subsystems even without the 
knowledge of what others are doing. Integration is simplified because all actors work toward achieving 
compatibility using a pre-specified interface. These characteristics give rise to the plug-and-play properties of 
modular systems (Baldwin & Clark, 2000).  
Managing a global partnership model 
 10 
expensive and technological uncertainty precludes modularity as an effective integration 
strategy. The need for specialized knowledge may require firms to work with partners who have 
no prior RSA, while changes to the program task requirements can make RSA from prior 
relationships less effective. Finally, the unique integration tools available to an MNE are not 
available across buyers and suppliers. This suggests a research gap in our understanding of how 
firms effectively integrate activities in globally disaggregated complex NPD projects. 
METHODS 
Approach and Context 
Our approach represents a combination of theory generation (Eisenhardt, 1989; Langley, 1999) 
and theory elaboration (Lee, 1999). We drew upon the emerging findings to elaborate and 
sharpen assertions made in these literatures. To guide the inquiry, we employed a conceptual 
framework consisting of a broadly defined research question (provided in the introduction) and 
some potentially important constructs (e.g., modularity, collocation, RSA) from the extant 
literature.  
Choice of Boeing and 787-Program. Our choice of Boeing was driven by theoretical and 
pragmatic reasons. On the theoretical front, focusing on Boeing’s 787-program is a globally 
distributed NPD effort involving cutting edge technologies where integration between the 
assembler and suppliers is crucial to program success. Additionally, the program was subject to a 
number of delays, chiefly attributed to integration issues between Boeing and its partners. 
Understanding the causes for these delays and the subsequent actions and outcomes provides a 
unique quasi-experimental setting to observe the development of integration capabilities in the 
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context of a global NPD project.4 More pragmatically, the access to significant personnel 
involved in the program provided a unique opportunity to observe the development of a complex 
product and its impact on Boeing’s attempt at global integration.  
The use of Boeing’s 787-program represents a single case, but it was chosen deliberately 
due to the insights it could offer. Boeing’s introduction of the 787, the real-time setting for the 
study, represents a revelatory case (Yin, 1994). And as such represents an important setting in 
which to study the research questions of interest.5 To industry observers, the Boeing 787 airplane 
represents a breakthrough product because “with this airplane, Boeing has radically altered—
indeed revolutionized—its approach to designing, building, and financing new products. Its role 
is that of ‘systems integrator,’ coordinating the design and development efforts of a group of 
largely non-U.S. partners” (Newhouse, 2007, p. 27). Boeing’s senior executives also see the 787 
as a breakthrough product. Walter Gillette, the Boeing vice president for engineering on the 
project, and a legend in aviation circles, reported that the 787-program was “the biggest step we 
[Boeing] have taken in fifty years” (The Financial Times, 2003, p. 27).  
The chosen time frame. Since the factors influencing the development of organizational 
capabilities and organizational design often include path dependencies that are cumulative and 
historically conditioned (Garud & Kotha, 1994; Langlois, 1988), a research design that 
generalizes uniqueness needs to be longitudinal. We selected 1996 as the starting point for 
analysis, since this was the year when Phil Condit unveiled Boeing’s Vision 2016, the document 
setting forth the company’s strategy for the next 20 years. Our endpoint was September 2011, the 

"For this study, we specifically concentrate on the integration issues between Boeing and its six major structural 
partners: three Japanese firms, Mitsubishi, Fuji and Kawasaki; an Italian firm, Alenia Aermacchi; and two U.S. 
firms, Vought Aircraft Industries, and Spirit Aerosystems.  
5Certainly some factors that enabled the making of the 787 are unique, which raises the question: How should one 
study a unique phenomenon and generalize it to given situations and circumstances? In such cases, it is the 
underlying processes that are often generalizable, and not the manifest unique phenomena (Garud & Kotha, 1994; 
Tsoukas, 1989). Our focus and challenge were to highlight these generalizable processes. 
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month that Boeing delivered the first aircraft for commercial use.  
Data Sources  
We employed data from three sources: (1) data from interviews with senior executives from, its 
suppliers, and industry experts; (2) archival data from press releases, internal Boeing 
publications, and extensive review of information available from public sources; and (3) emails, 
and phone calls with executives to fill-in gaps.  
Interview data. Our primary sources were interviews conducted with multiple 
respondents within Boeing and its suppliers. Given the sensitive nature of the program and the 
media scrutiny received, and senior manager’s general reluctance to share information, our initial 
goal was to access as many senior executives on the program team as possible. We began the 
study with one of the authors conducting a four-hour interview with Phil Condit, former Boeing 
CEO, on whose watch the 787 was conceptualized and launched. This was followed by two 
separate interviews with Mike Bair, the first 787-program manager. We interviewed others 
including the vice presidents in charge of supply-chain management and quality; the director 
responsible for marketing and sales, and the airplane’s interior design team; as well as other 
senior executives from units across the company. We also specifically interviewed three separate 
managers responsible for the Production Integration Center, one of the important tools Boeing 
employed to get greater control of its production system (described in detail later), to access non-
confidential information about how this center functioned. 
We also spoke to one of directors in charge of the Vought factory in Charleston, South 
Carolina on two different occasions, one of Boeing's major suppliers (prior to the acquisition of 
this factory by Boeing). We followed this interview with this senior executive from Vought with 
phone-calls and emails to fill-in gaps after Boeing’s acquisition of the Vought factory. Over a 
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four-year period, over 20 senior executives directly related to the program were interviewed. All 
interviews were recorded and professionally transcribed verbatim. Each interview lasted 1.5 
hours on average and resulted in transcripts averaging thirty-plus pages.  
All interviews consisted of open and close-ended questions. The closed-end part 
requested the senior manager to provide background information on the program so that we 
could supplement publicly available information with information directly gleaned from 
executives within Boeing. The open-ended part focused on non-confidential information 
unreported in the public media and Boeing press releases. Where appropriate and when relevant, 
we solicited information on managerial intentions and interpretation of how the program was 
conceptualized, structured and unfolded over time. We used both non-directive and directive 
questions at different points in the interview to ensure data accuracy while reducing the priming 
effects where informants feel the need to answer a question in a specific way (Bingham and 
Haleblian, 2012).6 
Books, cases, trade and newspaper articles. We supplemented interviews with secondary 
sources, including accounts provided by books (Newhouse, 1985, 2007; Norris et al., 2005), 
business cases (Kotha & Nolan, 2005; Esty & Kane, 2000), magazine and newspaper articles, 
investment and industry reports, and Boeing press releases. We also examined media reports, 
which often provide contextual information about industry dynamics, and firm- and program-
level actions and activities. Investment and industry reports (e.g., Reuters, Flight International) 
enabled us to validate emergent ideas regarding changes observed over time. Additionally, we 
examined over 800 newspaper and magazine articles on the program. Such multiple sources 
allowed us to examine the data from many vantage points and triangulate interview data with 

#The information presented here only includes publicly disclosed details and contains no proprietary information 
about the program.
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publicly accessible data such as media reports, press releases, and industry reports (Yin, 1994).   
Analysis 
We first analyzed the data by building our own case history for the Dreamliner 787 program. 
This case history was widely circulated to Boeing executives and corrected for factual errors. 
Using the material collected, we documented the airplane’s evolution chronologically and then 
systematically examined the 787-program as it unfolded over time. To enhance theoretical 
sensitivity, we also systematically compared integration tools used across different partners and 
over time. We were sensitive to the characterization of major structural partners to categories 
identified from public sources such as the extent of collocation and prior relationships with 
Boeing program. Typical for qualitative research (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997), we checked the 
validity of our insights with colleagues and senior executives. This iterative process resulted in 
multiple revisions and refinements. In the sections that follow, we discuss our detailed 
understanding of how the 787’s organizational architecture and Boeing’s integration capabilities 
evolved over the time period being studied.   
 
THE BOEING 787 PROGRAM: A GLOBALLY DISTRIBUTED DESIGN AND 
PRODUCTION SYSTEM 
 
Background and Antecedents 
In 1996, Phil Condit, the newly appointed Boeing CEO, unveiled a vision for the company. 
Dubbed the ‘Boeing 2016 Vision,’ it presented the company manifesto: ‘People working 
together as a global enterprise for aerospace leadership.’ In addition to becoming a global 
enterprise, Condit identified three major competencies that Boeing would leverage, large-scale 
systems integration being one. To industry observers this meant that Boeing wanted to transform 
from a wrench-turning manufacturer into a master planner, marketer, and snap-together 
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assembler of high-tech airplanes (Newhouse, 2007).  
Four years later, after two false starts, Boeing announced the 787-airplane (Boeing Press 
Release, December 20, 2002) a super-efficient plane that could fly as fast as today’s fastest 
commercial airplanes. The new airplane would use 20 percent less fuel than airplanes of 
comparable size, a major breakthrough for the aviation industry (Kotha & Nolan, 2005). Few 
years prior, in 2000, Airbus announced the commercial launch of the A380 super-jumbo and by 
2003 Airbus succeeded Boeing as the world’s largest builder of commercial airplanes for the first 
time (Taylor, 2003). As a result, industry observers questioned Boeing’s commitment to the 
commercial aviation industry as well as its ability to compete effectively against Airbus (cf. 
MacPherson & Pritchard, 2003). Given such concerns, the flawless execution of the 787-
program was a competitive necessity for Boeing.  
Organization Architecture of the 787-Program  
Boeing decided to build the 787 airplane using titanium and graphite (Norris et al., 2005) making 
it the world’s first commercial aircraft built with composite materials, a decision that would have 
profound implications for the design and manufacture of the aircraft. The design called for 
decomposing the airplane’s fuselage into major structural sections that could be built 
independently and mated together at the final assembly factory.  
The Global-Partnership Model. Boeing decided this innovative product design was 
better suited to a ‘global partnership model’ than earlier airplanes; now a global team of risk-
sharing partners would help finance, develop and market the airplane and Boeing, as the lead 
integrator, paid partners only after the airplanes were delivered to customers (Seattle Times, June 
15, 2003). Boeing reasoned that risk-sharing partners would have an incentive to complete the 
work efficiently and help sell the airplane in their respective markets.  
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Transformation of supplier relationships. The 787-program represented an entirely new 
way of working with partners. In the past, Boeing had worked with its partners in a mode called 
‘build to print’ where engineers developed the design and detailed drawings (often hundreds of 
pages) for every part of the plane and then contracted with partners to build the parts to exact 
specifications. In the 787 program, Boeing requested each partner to ‘build to performance’, 
where Boeing engineers provided specifications comprising tens of pages with performance 
metrics that the parts needed to meet (Kotha & Nolan, 2005). Innovation, detailed drawings, and 
tooling would become the direct responsibility of the partners. Bair, the first 787-program leader, 
elaborates:  
What we had done is we have taken the way that we have historically dealt with system suppliers and 
moved that into the airframe of the airplane. So rather than us doing all the engineering on the 
airframe and having suppliers do build-to-print, we put a fair amount of airplane design detail into the 
supply base. The fundamental premise there is that you want to have the ‘design and build’ aspects 
aligned because to think that you could optimize for efficient production in someone else’s factory, we 
have proven over and over again, is not the right answer. The suppliers know their factory, and their 
capabilities. They need to know this is going to work in order to make the subtle design decisions that 
they make in order ensure that they optimize the production of the airplane. (Interview data, 2008; 
emphasis added). 
 
Figure 1, Boeing’s template for implementing its global-partnership strategy, illustrates 
how the airplane’s major sections would be decomposed and built by partner firms. In all, 15 
Tier 1 partners formed Boeing’s new global network, with six taking on the responsibility for 
large structural sections (Seattle Times, June 15, 2003). 
‘Insert Figure 1 about here’ 
The design specified that Boeing and other US partners would manufacture 
approximately 35 percent of the airplane’s structure, Japanese companies 35 percent, and Italian 
companies 26 percent. Bair noted that access to IP, as well as the need to reduce market risk, 
drove Boeing’s supplier selection strategy:  
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[We looked] outside of the United States for partners. The thing that we were after was intellectual 
capital. We cast a net fairly wide in terms of getting the right, and the smartest, people in the world to 
help design this airplane. For example, the Italians, who were building part of the body and the 
horizontal tail, had some unique IP that we didn’t have. The Japanese have brought us certain 
measured discipline. It is sort of foreign, certainly foreign to the United States and really foreign to 
the Italians. We really have gotten the best of the best in terms of getting these kinds of benefits. 
(Interview data, 2008, emphasis added) 
 
Another new element in this approach was the requirement that suppliers assemble sub-
components or ‘stuff’ the modules before these were shipped to Boeing for final assembly. In 
previous programs, Boeing had assumed these tasks. Condit clarified the approach:  
It isn’t that a lot of things are ‘totally’ new. Often it is simply that we haven’t done it exactly this way 
in the past. What is ‘new’ is we are going to have a global partner ‘stuff’ the fuselage components, 
and we are going to snap it together with the central wing mount in an extraordinarily short time 
period. (Interview data, 2008).  
 
In other words, the 787 would be decomposed into completed ‘integrated assemblies,’ or work 
packages, to be built around the globe, and then transported to a Boeing final assembly plant at 
Everett, Washington (hereafter referred to as Everett). 
Boeing chose to use an air-transportation system to speed up delivery of work packages 
to Everett. The expected delivery time for work packages would be a day, rather than as much as 
30 days in other airplane programs. During final assembly, the large integrated assemblies would 
be ‘snap-fitted’ together in three days. The approach minimized the slack available in the system 
and required a tight integration between Boeing and structural partners.  
Organizational architecture. In the 787-program, Boeing had radically redesigned both 
the product and organizational architectures compared to programs such as the 767 or 777. The 
787’s organizational architecture is shown in Figure 2 (as finalized in 2004); the dotted line 
section represents Boeing’s boundaries (the Everett factories), distinguishing it as a separate 
entity. The small ‘e’ in the figure denotes the diminished engineering role of Boeing’s 
engineering (relative to past programs), since partners handled many aspects of the airplane’s 
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design. The circled ‘E’ in the various supplier boxes denotes the engineering/design work passed 
on to partners. The engineering and manufacturing interactions (shown by the arrows) at partner 
sites represent the ‘design and build’ alignment required for efficient production. Figures 1 and 2 
together illustrate the 787’s organizational architecture under which two factories—the Global 
Aeronautica (henceforth GA – a joint venture between Alenia and Vought) and Vought factories 
in Charleston, South Carolina—were central to the smooth functioning of the system because it 
was in here the partners pre-assembled major structural sections.  
‘Insert Figure 2 about here’ 
In 2004 Boeing began taking customer orders and expected to deliver the airplane in four 
years. Customers eagerly signed on, making 787 the fastest selling airplane in commercial 
aviation history. However, events turned out differently than planned during implementation.  
Delays to the 787-Program: Integration Problems and Attempts to Fix Them 
Starting in September 2007, the program started running into embarrassing delays—delays that 
represented a serious setback for Boeing’s intent of being a ‘large-scale systems integrator.’ 
Table 2 provides a summary and reasons for the 787 delivery delays. The delays were attributed 
to Boeing’s problems in implementing the global-partnership model. According to The Wall 
Street Journal (Lunsford, 2008): 
Boeing extolled the business virtues of having suppliers from as far away as Japan and Italy build 
much of the fuel-efficient new jetliner, with Boeing performing final assembly. … But the plan 
backfired when suppliers fell behind in getting their jobs done, . . . [and] Boeing was forced to turn to 
its own union workforce to piece together the first few airplanes after they arrived at the company's 
factory in Everett, Wash., with thousands of missing parts. 
 
Jim McNerney, Boeing’s current CEO, readily admitted Boeing’s difficulty in executing their 
chosen strategy, but saw no reason to change Boeing’s approach:  
The global partnership model of the 787 remains a fundamentally sound strategy. It makes sense to 
utilize technology and technical talent from around the world. It makes sense to be involved with the 
industrial bases of countries that also support big customers of ours. But we may have gone a little too 
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far, too fast in a couple of areas. I expect we’ll modify our approach somewhat on future programs—
possibly drawing the lines differently in places with regard to what we ask our partners to do, but also 
sharpening our tools for overseeing overall supply chain activities. (Boeing Press Release, April 14, 
2008). 
 
The quote above indicates that Boeing had limited integration capabilities, and many of the 
partners lacked the required skills too. To fix the problems, McNerney directed that “Boeing 
managers take a more aggressive role in sticking their noses into suppliers' operations, including 
stationing Boeing employees in every major supplier's factory” (Lunsford, 2008). He named Pat 
Shanahan to head the program and reassigned Bair.  
As Table 2 illustrates, the botched assembly of the first 787-fuselages at two factories in 
Charleston, S.C. were responsible for the early delays. At Charleston, Vought Aircraft Industries 
managed one factory, and GA managed the other. Incomplete work from here “played a large 
part in the snafus that snarled the final assembly line in Everett that has delayed the 787’s first 
flight by 14 months.” (Gates, 2008). In response, Elmer Doty, CEO of Vought, countered:  
Vought’s role in the venture became problematic when the supply chain broke down and work that 
was to be completed by other major suppliers arrived in Charleston unfinished. … The problem was 
Vought had no control over the procurement of those large pieces [from Kawasaki, a Tier 1 Japanese 
partner in the program].  Boeing, as the prime contractor was responsible for managing those major 
partners. ... To manage the traveled work efficiently, you need that responsibility... That is best done 
by the prime [contractor]. (Quoted in Gates, 2008). 
 
Doty blamed Boeing’s organizational architecture for the delays.  
As Table 2 (delay #1) indicates, Spirit, formerly Boeing Wichita, was also responsible for 
some of the early delays. This partner was responsible for the forward fuselage of the airplane 
including the airplane’s cockpit installation and Honeywell, a sub-contractor, was responsible for 
the airplane’s flight control systems (Lunsford, 2007).  
‘Insert Table 2 about here’ 
Boeing managers took a series of steps to address the delays and get the 787-program 
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back on schedule. Broadly, their efforts focused on three major approaches: (1) adding engineers 
and promoting collaboration through collocation; (2) redrawing the boundaries of the 787 
program to bring the major fuselage assembly in-house; and (3) building the necessary tools to 
improve Boeing’s strategic integration capabilities.   
Adding engineers and promoting collaboration through collocation. Boeing reassigned 
engineers from other Boeing divisions to the 787-program to take responsibility for the specific 
parts of the airplane such as electrical systems, structures, and computers (The Wall Street 
Journal, October 8, 2009). Importantly, Boeing engineers’ role had gone from being passive 
observers to active participants. This new approach resulted from McNerney’s directive that 
Boeing managers ‘stick their noses into suppliers' operations.’ As Bair observes: 
Some of the things that we have learned [from the delays], and this is primarily around structural 
partners, we had assumed basically that all of the structural partners could do the exact sort of work 
statement. Bad assumption; some of them were really good at delivering the ‘whole package,’ and 
some of them had some deficiencies. … We probably wouldn’t have them do the complete package 
the same way next time around. So there is some fine-tuning around how we would divvy that work 
up that would probably yield us better results. (Interview data, 2008) 
 
Boeing engineers began to collaborate more intensely with partner firms to resolve 
immediate issues and avoid future delays. Specifically, Boeing responded by throwing both 
money (about $2 billion in additional R&D expenses) and people at the problem. It dispatched 
“dozens or hundreds of its own employees to attack problems at plants in Italy, Japan, and South 
Carolina” (Lunsford, 2007). Boeing engineers and production workers were stationed in the 
factories of Tier 1 suppliers to share their expertise and facilitate integration. Much of the focus 
and attention was centered on ‘bottlenecks’—the GA and Vought factories where pre-assembly 
was done, as Shanahan publicly discussed. 
We've had people, whether its supervision helping them with incorporating [design] changes back in 
Charleston or whether its been folks helping them with their supply chain, that's been ongoing for a 
better part of the start up of the program [since 2006]. More recently we just had a higher influx of 
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people into Charleston because you compare the capability and capacity, the limitation is there, it's 
not at Spirit, it's not at MHI or KHI or FHI. That seems to have the biggest payoff. [Quoted in 
Ostrower, July 2009] 
 
In fact, production delays recovered rapidly at Spirit, and Boeing managers attributed its quick 
turnaround to its former Boeing heritage and Spirit’s familiarity with Boeing’s tools and process 
(Gates, 2008). Figure 3 is a schematic representation of the changed organizational architecture 
and the arrows between Boeing’s engineering group and the suppliers’ engineering groups 
represent a marked departure in approach compared with Figure 2. 
‘Insert Figure 3 about here’ 
Redrawing the boundaries. In March 2008 Boeing bought Vought’s 50% stake in GA, 
thus forming a Boeing and Alenia joint venture. GA was the staging site where major fuselage 
sections from the Japanese and Italian partners were preassembled. Boeing attributed 
inefficiencies with GA for some of the delays.  
A year later (in August 2009), not pleased with the progress, in a major move Boeing 
bought Vought’s Charleston factory, relegating Vought to the role of a supplier of components 
and sub-systems.7 In December 2009, Boeing dissolved its joint venture with Alenia and took 
full control of the GA factory in Charleston. Thus, Boeing took over the entire preassembly 
activities at the Charleston location, a major move that addressed Doty’s earlier comments that 
responsibilities needed to be aligned. To industry observers this was not a surprise, as Scott 
Fancher, the next 787-program manager had publicly noted that this might happen,  
You know, you get into a situation where either some of the first tiers, or their sub-tiers simply aren't 
able to perform, now there could be a lot of reasons for that, could be that they are in financial stress, 
could be that technically they've run into a situation they can't handle or could be the complexity of the 
production of the product that they've designed is beyond their capability, so we tend to look at the 
root cause of the non-performance and how can we help them succeed. … Clearly as we go forward 
we'll look at some re-balancing of work scope as we sort through where work is most efficiently and 

7
 After taking charge of the 787-program, Pat Shanahan’s first major move was to re-assign a senior Boeing 
executive who was in-charge of 787 production to oversee all the development activities at the Vought factory at 
Charleston.  
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cost effectively done, but by and large the focus is on helping our supply chain succeed, not moving 
the work in a rapid fashion [without completing it]. [Quoted in Ostrower, June 1, 2009].  
 
Boeing reorganized Vought’s factory and took responsibility for assembling the 
airplane’s floor grid, which was previously outsourced to Israel Aircraft Industries; this 
supplier’s role would now be limited to delivering components, which were then assembled into 
full sections by Boeing employees and installed into the fuselage at the Charleston plant. Similar 
changes were carried out throughout the global-supply network to rationalize the production 
network, and redefine areas of responsibility to match Boeing and supplier’s capabilities. 
Building tools and routines for integration. The new global-partnership strategy dictated 
that instead of individual parts, ‘stuffed’ modules or ‘work packages’ would be assembled at 
Everett. In line with Boeing’s ‘blueprint’ for the 787, the factory was optimized for ‘snap-fitting’ 
major completed sections. So when incomplete work packages began to arrive (Delay #3 in 
Table 2), the Everett factory was unable to assemble these subsections.  
Boeing managers recognized that for the system to work effectively, greater oversight of 
the supply-chain system was necessary, as McNerney had observed. Echoed Scott Carson, CEO 
of Boeing Commercial Airplanes, “In addition to oversight [of the program], you need insight 
into what’s actually going on in those [partner] factories. … Had we had adequate insight, we 
could have helped our suppliers understand the challenges” [quoted in Lunsford, 2007]. In other 
words, having insight or visibility would then enable Boeing to predict, not just react to, supply-
chain contingencies (e.g., delays #3, #4, #5, and #6). According to Ben Funston, one of Boeing’s 
executives in supply management: 
On a legacy program you can pretty much walk out into the Everett factory and kind of get a feel for 
how production’s going. … The reason isn’t because that’s an all inside make, but basically because 
we ship in a bunch of small sub-assemblies and we integrate it all here. … In the 787, by the time you 
get here to Everett you’re receiving a few sections of fuselage and wings and we integrate it here. … 
So we needed a tool to give us situational awareness into the production system, the ability to have 
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early issue detection and real-time problem resolution. If you find it here or even if you find it at the 
partner before he’s getting ready to ship, it’s too late [quoted in Creedy, 2010, emphasis added]. 
Creating Visibility  
To create situational awareness or visibility the 787-team created the Production Integration 
Center (PIC) in December 2008. According to Bob Noble, vice president for 787’s supply chain, 
the center’s purpose was “to provide situational awareness, early issue detection and real-time 
problem resolution for the 787 Dreamliner production system” [quoted in Ostrower, 2009]. The 
PIC is a 5,100-square-foot center that operates around the clock, with translators for 28 different 
languages (James, 2009).8 The center was manned by multi-functional teams of experts who 
specialized in different functional areas pertaining to aircraft design, avionics, structures, 
technology, assembly and logistics. The center also continuously monitored conditions around 
the world, ranging from natural disasters such as tornados or earthquakes, and political situation 
such as riots and epidemics like the swine flu, all of which could potentially affect production 
and transportation of finished fuselage sections to Everett (James, 2009).  
The PIC was designed as a centralized facility to help integrate the global product 
system. First, it helped coordinate problem solving by improving communication and facilitating 
collaboration among Boeing and partner engineers. For instance, if an engineer at one of the 
partner sites had an issue, he or she could contact the center to be connected with appropriate 
Boeing personnel who would help resolve it. Hence, Boeing could now respond to issues by 
helping suppliers’ engineers communicate directly with their Boeing counterparts. Second, as the 

8
 The PIC holds 27 workstations, each with three screens, and a huge video screen in the front of the room, 40 feet 
long and 10 feet high with 24 separate screens that monitor news around the world, report on global weather 
patterns, provide real-time information on production issues with each supplier, highlight the health of 787-related 
computer servers, and display shipping schedules for the four giant Dreamlifters (converted 747s that transported 
787 parts to Everett) (James, 2009). 
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center’s partner call volume increased, managers instituted routines to prioritize them (Creedy, 
2010).9 This provided greater focus and attention to issues that mattered in resolving delays.   
Third, the center provided high-definition cameras at partner sites so that engineers at 
partner sites could employ multimedia communications to diagnose and address problems. As 
Michaels and Sanders (2009) observed,  
Suppliers as far afield as Australia, Italy, Japan and Russia could call in through translators and show 
Boeing engineers in the center close-up images of the their components using high-definition 
handheld video cameras. … Immediate, multimedia communications have eliminated the problem of 
unclear email exchanges between distant engineers who work on the opposite ends of the clock.  
Using such visual access to partner sites and rich information, Boeing developed a variety of 
proprietary routines to gain visibility and monitor the system.10  
Lastly, the center took responsibility for transporting structural sections throughout the 
network and ensuring that they arrived at Everett as scheduled. Boeing managers recognized that 
effectively managing the fuselage transportation was critical for system effectiveness. With this 
new air-transportation system, Boeing minimized work-in process inventory (and related 
carrying costs), by reducing the time it took to transport large fuselage sections for assembly at 
Everett. This approach was in line with Boeing’s stated goal of becoming a lean manufacturer as 
described in Boeing 2016 vision document. Table 3 describes in detail of the routines that the 
center developed to create visibility. Also the PIC is represented as an important addition as 
shown in Figure 3. 
‘Insert Table 3 about here’ 
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 Funston, one of the senior executives observes, “If we came in and said this is an absolute line-stopper for the 
program, then everyone stops what they are doing at that site and realigns to that priority” [quoted in Creedy, 2010]. 
$%For instance, managers created routines for recording and monitoring of phone calls for assistance from partners, 
and visually mapping and updating production status at partner factories in real time. They also developed 
simulation routines to understand system behavior when faced with major disruptions.
Managing a global partnership model 
 25 
The Evolution of the PIC. Over time, the type of calls and volume received changed, the 
center’s role evolved. Initially the incoming calls focused on resolving aircraft design issues 
between engineers at partners and Boeing engineers, and this was then followed by incoming 
calls focusing on production-related issues. To address them, first the center was initially staffed 
with multi-disciplinary teams of engineers representing major aircraft systems. Then it was 
organized to support each Tier 1 suppliers to handle production-related issues (i.e., the groups 
within the PIC who worked mostly with a specific supplier and handled integration problems). 
As design and production-related issues were slowly resolved, the center took requests for the 
rapid delivery of critical parts needed at partner factories in addition to scheduled transportation 
of pre-assembled sections. It was then reorganized to address assembly issues at Everett.  
The center served as the ‘mission control’ for the 787’s global supply chain using its 
proprietary routines. With time, Boeing has reduced the number of its engineers collocated at 
partner sites and the resources allocated to the PIC.11 Industry experts concur that the center was 
pivotal in stabilizing the 787’s supply chain as measured by declining travelled work (Ostrower, 
2009). Travelled work represents work that should have been completed by the supplier, but 
given the schedule requirements was not accomplished there but nevertheless was shipped to 
Everett for Boeing factory workers to complete. After almost three years of delay, Boeing 
delivered a 787 airplane to launch customer ANA in September 2011. 
DISCUSSION 
Our intent was to understand how firms integrate activities in globally disaggregated complex 
NPD projects. Our analysis suggests that the lead integrator, Boeing, faced challenges pertaining 
to three distinct components of integration. Boeing recognized they needed two types of 

$$Noted a manager at the PIC, “we impact the [787] program costs by reducing the number of people needed in the 
field on the field [at partner sites]. We still have people out in the field, but with the PIC, the question is whether it 
will be one person or 10 people that we need to send to our partner factories.” (Interview data, 2011).
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visibility to address these integration challenges and invested in the necessary tools to effectively 
increase visibility.  
Components of Integration 
Boeing faced integration challenges relating to: (1) design integration; (2) production integration; 
and (3) supply-chain integration.  
Design Integration. This pertains to how Boeing divided and distributed major airplane 
design-related tasks to partners, based on an initial assessment of partner capabilities and the 
resulting coordination costs.12 Boeing managers felt that the 787-airplane program merited a 
‘global partnership model,’ which was broadly in concordance with its intent to transform their 
identity to become a global large-scale systems integrator. Also, Boeing was interested in 
mitigating financial and marketing risk and securing IP rights for composite technology.13  
One criterion Boeing employed to allocate tasks involved partners’ underlying 
competence to implement a complex program: Three major Japanese firms had worked with 
Boeing designing wings for the 777 and 767 airplanes, programs dating back to the 1980s, which 
made them ideal partners. Boeing’s relationship with Alenia, the Italian manufacturer, also dated 
back to 1980s; moreover, Alenia possessed expertise in specialized composites that Boeing 
needed (Blair, Interview data, 2008). 
The 787-program differed in one important respect. In the past Boeing had provided 
detailed specifications, but for this program it chose to supply only broad design parameters; 
partners had to use their own expertise to design and build major structural sections of the 

12The appropriate division of labor is important for both effectiveness (assigning subtasks to those partners most 
capable of completing them) and efficiency (assigning subtasks to partners to minimize coordination costs). The 
former is important for accessing and incorporating specialist knowledge into products, and the latter is necessary to 
complete projects within agreed-upon budgets, schedules, and lower costs.  
13While task assignment (who does what) represents a high-level decision choice (e.g., wings are to be made by 
Mitsubishi) and is relatively simple to envision, it is generally harder to achieve at the activity level (e.g., should 
Mitsubishi or Fuji be responsible for designing how to join the wings to the center wing-box?). 
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airplane. Boeing assumed that the chosen partners would have the requisite competencies to do 
design and integration work, and build preassembled sections, but this assumption would prove 
invalid. Bair conceded, “We had assumed basically that all of the structural partners could do the 
exact sort of work statement. [This was a] bad assumption” (Interview data, 2008). Thus, when 
some partners were unable to perform as expected, the program faced delays.14 
Another criterion for allocating tasks was designing a system that reduced coordination 
costs. As the program unfolded, it became clear that GA and Vought factories were vulnerable to 
misalignment issues caused by organizational architecture (see Delays #4, 5, and 6). While they 
integrated major subsystems from Tier 1 partners, they lacked the disciplinary authority when 
incomplete subassemblies arrived in Charleston, S.C. This was essentially the complaint that 
Doty, Vought’s CEO, had made when he noted it was Boeing, not Vought, who was responsible 
for managing other Tier 1 partners.  
According to our analysis, design integration includes both short- and long-term 
components. In the short term, the airplane has to be delivered to waiting customers and 
decisions regarding the realignment of tasks allocated to partners followed that imperative. Faced 
with mounting delays, Boeing bought out Vought’s stake in GA. Prior to the acquisition, Boeing 
collocated numerous engineers at Vought and Alenia to support them. As collocated managers 
assessed partner capabilities, they came to understand the interdependencies between partners. In 
the longer term, however, as efficiency considerations become more salient and the production 

14Ex ante, it appears that the tasks performed by Vought and Alenia were more complex and subject to greater 
uncertainty than those performed by the Japanese partners. Thus, while the Japanese were largely responsible for 
delivering subcomponents, along with building parts of the composite fuselage, Vought and Alenia, were 
responsible for “stuffing” them, a task that Boeing’s partners had never done before. Also, as Bair notes, Japanese 
aerospace companies were admired for their disciplined approach, something that Boeing’s U.S. and Italian partners 
seemed to lack.  
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system stabilizes, Boeing could consider externalizing its factories at Charleston. Boeing's 
Vision 2016 mission statement called for precisely such a transformation.  
Although the six Tier 1 risk-sharing structural partners might have worked together to 
achieve better integration, in reality Boeing as the central actor intervened to make changes. 
Using its bargaining power, the company changed the division of labor to achieve better task 
allocation, reflecting studies of large-scale integration regarding the final assembler’s central role 
in reconfiguring complex systems (cf. Argyres, 1999). Given the uncertainty about the nature of 
interdependence and the lack of precise information about partners’ abilities it is unclear whether 
Boeing could have achieved better design integration ex ante. Boeing has had relationships 
averaging 30 years with its six structural partners, which suggests that when qualitative changes 
are introduced into buyer-partner relationships (in this case, moving from ‘build-to-print’ to 
‘build-to-performance’ model), previous stocks of RSA may not be sufficient to make task 
assignment decisions of importance. 
Production Integration. This integration pertains to how production-related tasks 
including product design and manufacturing are coordinated across partners and the final 
assembler. As Bair noted earlier, Boeing wanted each partner to design and manufacture 
subassemblies in order to align the ‘design and build’ aspects at partner factories (i.e., partners 
and not Boeing were better positioned to optimize their factories for efficient production). 
Boeing’s logic was to encourage a ‘thick interface’ between design and build at partner factories 
instead of having them rely on Boeing as in previous programs (see Figure 2). However, in 
practice, the partners not only had to optimize their own factories but also had to integrate their 
efforts with the lead integrator and other partners. Boeing had generated this skill in past 
programs, but their partners had not, since in the old ‘build-to-print’ regime suppliers worked 
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mostly from codified knowledge that Boeing shared with them. McNerney recognized this when 
he directed Boeing to ‘poke their nose into supplier operations,’ a message that was contrary to 
the initial program design philosophy. Importantly, the 787-team recognized that it needed a tool 
that would give them insight and visibility into partner facilities, as Scott Carson, the CEO of 
Boeing Commercial, had observed. 
Achieving production integration required a number of changes. First, Boeing added 
more engineers and machinists to the program, who then became active participants and 
collaborators instead of passive observers (contrast Boeing’s role in Figure 3 versus in Figure 2). 
Second, hundreds of design and production engineers were collocated at partner factories, 
bolstering partner expertise, though it appears that the improvement in production integration 
came from their knowledge of Boeing’s processes and ability to highlight partner deficiencies. 
These engineers are akin to ‘boundary spanners’ (to use the terminology of Mudambi, 2011) who 
are recognized and credible to both Boeing engineers as well as partner engineers. They play a 
critical role in knowledge transfer across boundaries both within a MNC firm and often across 
firms.   
Third, managers created a unique IT-enabled centralized integration center (i.e., PIC) as 
described in detail earlier. This center was staffed with multi-functional teams and they instituted 
processes and routines for prioritizing and attending to calls so that requests for help from 
partners were dealt with in a timely manner. Such processes and routines are akin to what 
(Carlile, 2002) has described as ‘boundary objects’ that are critical for knowledge transfer across 
boundaries. Boundary objects represent ‘a means of representing, learning about, and 
transforming knowledge to resolve the consequences that exist at a given boundary’ (Carlile, 
2002: 1526). They instituted routines that created a sense of urgency on the part of Boeing 
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personnel to respond to requests by tracking and monitoring calls, accessing senior managers if 
needed. The center also included tools that established the necessary ‘contextual common 
ground’ (Srikanth & Puranam, 2011) needed to resolve issues such as the use of translators and 
video cameras.15 Overall, these routines enhanced joint problem solving between Boeing and its 
structural partners by increasing visibility.  
Supply-Chain Integration. Consistent with Boeing’s relations with its structural partners, 
we characterize the supply chain as the purchasing operations and relationships between a firm 
and its first tier suppliers including buyer-seller alliances and partnerships (Cavinto, 1992; 
Bloker, Lackey and Mabert, 1993). Effective supply-chain integration is critical for network 
effectiveness and encompasses the integration of information flows, physical flows and financial 
flows between a firm and its supply-chain partners (Rai, Patnayakuni and Seth, 2006). By design, 
Boeing chose to air transport preassembled sections removing slack in the system, which made 
supply-chain integration a priority for the airplane’s production.16  
Supply-chain integration challenges loomed large during program implementation (see 
Delays #3 and 4 in Table 2). To transport preassembled sections, processes and routines were 
instituted at the centralized integration center. One set was aimed at scheduling the airplanes 
Boeing used to transport sections to the pre-assembly factories in Charleston, and between South 
Carolina and Everett. Another set tracked potentially disruptive events (natural disasters such as 
earthquakes) so that appropriate actions could minimize their impact on material flows 
throughout the 787-network. These routines also enabled Boeing to monitor the work-in-progress 
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$&The need for context-specific knowledge to coordinate across locations is referred as contextual knowledge or 
contextual common ground in the academic literature (Kraut et al, 2002; Olson et al, 2002). But Boeing managers 
internally refer to such knowledge as situational awareness. 
16With time and greater stability in the production network, supply chain integration has increased in importance. 
Such integration is likely to become even more complex as Boeing ramps up production from the current production 
of two planes per month to a planned rate of ten a month. Boeing opened a final assembly plant at its Charleston 
location next to the two factories it acquired from Vought and Alenia, modeled after its final assembly plant in 
Everett. 
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at the partner factories enabling it to predict potential delays and address them in order to 
maintain the schedule. While in theory Boeing could have outsourced transportation of large 
fuselage sections, given the specialized nature of these assets (the ability to design and modify 
747 jumbo jets) Boeing decided to do this in-house.  
Visibility Mechanisms for Integration 
As the 787 program unfolded, Boeing managers recognized that they needed two types of 
visibility to address the integration challenges they faced. On the one hand, partners needed 
access to Boeing’s and other partners’ expertise so that appropriate knowledge could be obtained 
for diagnosing and resolving problems. On the other, Boeing needed awareness of partner 
activities throughout the network to fully comprehend the issues confronting them.  
We term the first type of visibility ‘knowledge’ visibility, and the second ‘activity’ 
visibility. Activity visibility provides the contextual and tacit information necessary to solve 
problems and is helpful in monitoring partner activities in real-time throughout the entire 
network. Knowledge visibility makes visible the locus of expertise that is available throughout 
the network. Without such visibility, partners find it difficult to locate the expertise needed to 
address issues confronting them in timely fashion. Activity visibility and knowledge visibility, as 
discussed here, are independent constructs although they often co-exist in practice. 
To carry out effective design integration, the lead integrator needs to better understand 
the nature of interdependence, assess partner competence, and reassign tasks as issues arise. Both 
activity visibility and knowledge visibility help promote such an understanding and in the 
process enable better design integration. In production integration, the nature of the integration 
effort shifts towards addressing issues that often arise at the nexus of product design and 
manufacturing. Knowledge visibility helps access the expertise required from the network to 
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solve such issues. Activity visibility promotes building contextual common ground between the 
partner and lead integrator (the one with the expertise) and helps the engineers better understand 
the tacit components involved in finding a solution.17 Therefore, both activity and knowledge 
visibility play an important role in production integration. With regards to supply-chain 
integration, the onus is on predicting likely disruptions and addressing them before they ripple 
across the network. Activity visibility enables monitoring partner factories to predict potential 
disruptions that can occur. Knowledge visibility, in this context, can help the engineers find ways 
to ensure that schedules are synchronized and deliveries are prioritized so that disruptions in 
supply chain are minimized.  
In summary, both activity visibility and knowledge visibility are important in achieving 
all the three components of integration.  
Tools for Integration 
Boeing used a combination of traditional and novel tools to enable visibility of both kinds. These 
included: collocation, the PIC, and vertical integration. .  
Collocation. In general, collocation provides both high levels of contextual common 
ground and unconstrained opportunities for rich face-to-face interactions, thus enabling a lead 
integrator to achieve activity visibility. Through such visibility the lead integrator can assess 
suppliers’ competence, understand the nature of interdependence, and engage in joint problem 
solving. In other words, with activity visibility the lead integrator can redesign/reassign tasks to 
facilitate better design integration. The quality of activity visibility that collocation permits 
makes it an important tool for achieving production integration (see Table 4 for details).  

17
 Suppose supplier X has problem P. Supplier X needs to search to find out who can help solve this problem. 
Knowledge visibility allows Supplier X to find out that engineer ‘Y’ in the lead integrator or another partner can 
solve this problem. In order to solve this problem, Y needs activity visibility because X cannot articulate all the tacit 
contextual information that is necessary to solve the problem.  
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In our context, despite its initial organizational architecture for the 787-program, Boeing 
discovered that some collocation was unavoidable especially during the early phases. Collocating 
Boeing personnel at partner factories aided integration by providing Boeing the ability see 
partner activity and assist them access expertise at Boeing. In other words, collocated Boeing 
personnel were able to deeply understand the issues partners faced in their respective factories 
and knew whom to contact at Boeing Everett to help address such issues. Collocating personnel 
also provided Boeing the ability to assess partner competence and willingness to adapt and learn 
providing a ‘partner monitoring’ mechanism.  
Centralized integration support center. Boeing found one reason for program delays was 
that some of its partners were unable to complete the task assigned them in a timely manner, 
frequently because of cascading interdependence between the partners. The partners needed the 
knowledge regarding whom to contact at Boeing to help fix issues, and Boeing, for its part, 
needed to know which of the partners needed assistance. Additionally, Boeing needed a 
mechanism to access the tacit knowledge regarding the partner’s context to better appreciate and 
help partners solve problems.18 In other words, although Boeing, as the prime contractor, was 
ideally suited to facilitate inter-partner integration, it was unable to do so without the necessary 
activity visibility and knowledge visibility.  
Through the centralized center Boeing was able gain information about partner activities 
and the situational context, and the partners, in turn, had a way to access Boeing’s expertise. The 
center promoted activity visibility through the use of high-definition cameras and artifact-based 
communications. Based on the requests for assistance from distributed partners, the lead 

$'Both these issues were new to the ‘build to performance’ regime instituted with the 787-program. Boeing had 
initially assumed that it was best to resolve integration issues by tightly coupling design and manufacturing at 
partner sites. However, this approach failed to address the need for integration between partners and Boeing and 
among partners when program implementation started. 
Managing a global partnership model 
 34 
integrator mobilized and directed resources and expertise to solve problems at partner factories 
achieving production integration. In fact, the center centralized and prioritized communications 
and routed problems to potential solvers across the network. In other words, the center (and the 
specific processes and routines that underlie it) promoted both activity and knowledge visibility, 
which in turn enabled design (i.e., task reassignment) and production integration. The activity 
visibility also enabled Boeing access to information needed for better supply-chain integration. 
Some examples of how both activity and knowledge visibility generated by the center were 
important in achieving design, production and supply-chain integration are illustrated in Table 4.  
Vertical Integration. Faced with short-term pressures and the inability of the Vought and 
GA factories to resolve issues rapidly, Boeing acquired these facilities, using its authority as the 
prime contractor for bargaining clout. Despite having significant prior relationships with Boeing 
and being risk-sharing partners, these partners were reluctant to reorganize their factories to 
generate the required action visibility. Some of the partners also lacked the authority to direct the 
actions of other Tier 1 partners, while still being responsible for integrating their work. The 
traditional role of vertical integration is that activities in sub-units could be reorganized by 
recourse to fiat, which is how Boeing gained the authority to reorganize the factories in South 
Carolina. Boeing then opened them up for closer scrutiny, thus improving activity visibility, 
which facilitated all three integration components.  
‘Insert Figure 4 and Table 4 about here’ 
Figure 4 summarizes the interrelationship among the three components of integration, the 
mechanisms and tools discussed above in a simplified framework. Vertical integration enables 
integration of all three components primarily through action visibility. Both collocation and 
developing a centralized center enable integration of all components via both activity visibility 
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and knowledge visibility. However, as the illustrated in the different weights of interconnections, 
the knowledge visibility created by a centralized center (i.e., the PIC) appears superior to that 
solely dependent on collocating engineering personnel at partner facilities because knowledge 
visibility created by a collocated engineer is limited on his or her ties in the network. However, a 
centralized system can help a partner access to experts throughout the network giving the center 
the ability to match knowledge sources with where they are required rapidly. However, activity 
visibility generated by a centralized center is not as detailed as that generated by collocating 
personnel, since being immersed in the context allows for much richer interactions than using 
tools such as video-cameras. As shown in Table 4, though knowledge visibility generated by 
collocation is also useful for production and supply-chain integration, collocation’s impact is less 
important for these in our setting, primarily because the centralized center took over many of 
these functions.  
CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
We began with the premise that NPD programs that involve cutting-edge technologies 
distributed across both geographic and firm boundaries presented unique integration challenges. 
In this case, technological uncertainty precluded modularity, and collocation of assembler and 
supplier engineers (as has been done in the past) is expensive. Prior work on buyer-supplier 
relationships has been silent on how to manage the impact of geographic dispersion, except to 
point out that greater dispersion may result in poor integration outcomes (Dyer, 2000). The 
extant international business research has emphasized how the level of unified authority 
characterizes the integration issues within MNE (Mudambi & Navarra, 2004). However, such 
authority is generally absent in buyer-supplier relationships. It is from this context that this paper 
makes novel contributions.  
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First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that provides a holistic 
understanding of what constitutes achieving integration from the context of a complex NPD 
program carried out across geographic and firm boundaries. We found three distinct components 
of integration capabilities. Prior studies of complex NPD programs primarily highlighted 
‘production integration’ challenges, and neglected the ‘design’ and ‘supply-chain’ integration 
issues faced by firms using a globally distributed partnership model. Our finding suggests that as 
firms grapple with production-integration challenges, they realize that these challenges can arise 
from improper or poor design integration. In large complex products all three integration 
components may tax a firm’s ability to achieve integration leading to a modicum of system 
stability.  
Interestingly, all three components gained salience at different times during the program 
implementation. The division of labor decisions made as part of design integration needed to 
happen first. Poor decisions at this stage can lead to production integration problems. In novel 
and complex systems it may be impossible to achieve perfect design integration ex-ante; any 
observed production-integration problems are fixed first by achieving better design integration. 
Supply-chain integration issues are typically faced after the product design has stabilized and 
many technical issues in manufacturing are ironed out. Supply chain integration leverages the 
activity visibility generated for production integration and moves towards predicting and 
preventing integration issues rather than reacting to them.  
Second, in contrast to past research focused on collocation and/or RSA as the primary 
tools for achieving integration, this study highlights the role played by a dedicated centralized 
center specifically designed to achieve integration. As a tool, the integration center has become 
the brain behind Boeing’s integration efforts. Specifically, our findings highlight the importance 
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of two distinct types of “visibility” as critical mechanisms underlying integration.19 As a 
centralized entity, the center increases visibility (activity and knowledge) and thus enables the 
prime contractor to achieve and maintain integration. Its effectiveness can be seen in improved 
integration performance while simultaneously reducing collocation needs. 
Third, analyzing the center’s role helped to clarify interrelationships among such 
integration tools as collocation, RSA, and authority. As noted, collocation is difficult and 
expensive to achieve in a globally distributed complex NPD project, and RSA’s effectiveness as 
a tool is unclear when task requirements change. Our findings point to the indispensability of 
some collocation in such situations regardless of cost; we also found that collocation varied by 
partners’ ability to accomplish their assigned tasks (e.g., Vought and Alenia required greater 
collocation than Spirit). As routines were established to promote production and supply-chain 
integration to stabilize the system, the amount of collocation was gradually reduced, suggesting 
that a dedicated integration center can largely (but not completely) substitute for collocating 
personnel at partner facilities.20  
Also, past research has not explicitly examined whether collocation and RSA are 
complements or substitutes, though they are both important tools to achieve integration. 
Collocation enables visibility of activities at partner facilities and limited visibility of knowledge 
located in the two firms. RSA or social integration over time leads to increasing knowledge 
visibility. Specifically, RSA cannot fully substitute for collocation in complex projects because it 
cannot provide activity visibility. In this case, the changed task (build-to-performance vs. build-

19Prior work has referred to collocation, RSA, and normative and social integration as “integration mechanisms.” To 
us these represented tools and not mechanisms. Each of these tools increases visibility between the partners, which 
is the mechanism by which these tools facilitate achieving integration.  
20
 One can think of the relationship between collocation and the integration center similar to the relationship 
between capital and labor in a (Cobb-Douglas) production function. Some collocation is necessary for efficient 
functioning, but the integration center can effectively substitute after a threshold minimum level. 
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to-print in earlier programs) further constrained RSA effectiveness.  The integration center 
however was designed to provide both visibility of knowledge and visibility of activities.  
Fourth, regarding the role played by authority, our preliminary findings add limited 
empirical traction to the largely theoretical debate over the role of authority in the knowledge-
based view of the firm (KBV). The defining question in the theory of the firm literature is the 
boundary choice between pure markets and hierarchies. Kogut and Zander (1992, 1996) assert 
that firms are communities that enable knowledge exchange and coordination based on 
continuity of association and common identity, leading to a common language and higher order 
organizing principles. In contrast, Williamson (1991) argues that authority is important because 
it prevents haggling over gains/costs and reduces transaction costs.21 Empirically distinguishing 
these assertions is difficult in practice because a firm is both a boundary of association and 
authority. Hence, it is not surprising that the empirical evidence is mixed.22 The 787-program 
involves risk-sharing partners and lies in the “swollen middle” (Hennart, 1993) between pure 
markets and hierarchies. Thus, it provides an opportunity to examine the assertions raised above.  
When Boeing acquired the Vought and GA facilities, the unified authority enabled the 
Charleston factories merit the attention of the internal buyer in Everett, in order to approve 
coordination changes and integrate production, a task the external supplier had struggled with. 
Integration also enabled investment in visibility enhancing mechanisms that some external 
suppliers were reluctant to invest in. Also, Doty of Vought had complained about having the 
responsibility to integrate with other Tier 1 structural partners without the authority to mandate 
any changes, which technically should not have been a problem since the partners’ incentives 

21Building on Williamson’s work, Argyres (1999) has speculated that “some sort of hierarchical mechanism may be 
needed in the early stages of systems development and adoption in order to overcome inherent transaction cost and 
bargaining problems” (p. 168). 
22 Some studies have found little difference between within-firm integration versus between-firm integration (Helper 
et al., 2000), while others showed that within-firm integration is superior (Almeida et al., 2002). 
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were aligned towards swiftly achieving effective integration. Our findings therefore suggest that 
authority (or bargaining power) may be necessary in generating requisite visibility for integrating 
activities. A dedicated integration center, such as the PIC, is only as useful as the “visibility” it 
helps generate.23 This suggests that the visibility necessary for coordination is generated more 
easily in the presence of authority, a point that needs validation in future empirical studies.  
Finally, these assertions have some very interesting implications for a firm contemplating 
a global strategy. On the one hand, researchers have suggested that the raison d'être for the MNE 
is to leverage economies of knowledge and learning across different geographies (Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 1989; Buckley & Casson, 1976; Mudambi, 2011). A MNE that truly depends on 
integration across geographies for its competitive advantage is more likely to succeed if the 
headquarters (HQ) played a strong role. On the other, a strong HQ challenges subsidiary 
autonomy and flexibility (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Meyer et al., 2008; Mudambi & Navarra, 
2004). So the international business research suggests given such trade-offs middle positions are 
unsustainable. But our findings suggest middle positions are sustainable if the HQ managers 
have the tools to generate visibility across the MNE network of subsidiaries. 
Study Limitations 
This is one of the first inductive studies to examine a complex globally distributed NPD project. 
While our choice of program and industry may limit the generalizability of the findings, it has 
enabled us to take a more fine-grained approach to analyzing how global integration capabilities 
emerge in practice. Such detail would be difficult if not impossible to capture through large 
sample studies (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989). Given our objective of understanding the boundary 

23 From a variety of motivation considerations, partners may limit the their facilities' visibility to the systems 
integrator. Collocation is one means of overcoming such motivation challenges as the collocated integrator’s 
engineers can monitor the activities of partners. However, in a globally disaggregated program, this is a costly 
solution. In these cases, authority could remove potential impediments to achieving such visibility. 
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conditions of existing theory, this approach was well suited to our research question. Also, some 
of the processes and mechanisms highlighted are generalizable across other complex globally 
distributed programs.  
We recognize that there are numerous other important issues to the success of venturing 
into a NPD in a globally disaggregated supply chain. Given our interests and the thrust of the 
special issue, we restricted the scope of the paper and focused extensively on activity 
coordination among actors and deliberately ignored other important aspects of new-product 
development such as financing models for complex projects, project management issues, 
supplier selection and the role played by risk in the initial design and subsequent reorganization 
of the airplane’s program architecture. These aspects of the program not examined here are 
interesting avenues for future research.  
Our primary informants were Boeing employees. Although we interviewed Boeing 
personnel who were directly involved in supplier integration issues at Vought, both before and 
after its takeover by Boeing, we did not interview other major suppliers, which is a limitation to 
our data. However, since we relied on media reports and comments by industry observers, we 
provide a balanced and accurate understanding of how events unfolded. Finally, we were not 
privy to other tools that Boeing may have used to manage the program. Given the importance 
and complexity of this topic, it would be an excellent avenue for future research.  
Past research has suggested that when a product’s architecture is modular, knowledge 
integration from external sources is less difficult (Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Brusoni et al, 2001). 
But technological uncertainty and an incomplete understanding of interdependencies preclude 
modularity and increases misalignment risk (Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004). It is possible that once 
the 787-production system reaches a level state, and when interdependencies are better 
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understood, greater modularity may be achieved. In other words, modularity may not be initially 
designed in a complex system; it may emerge with time, as the interdependencies are better 
understood. This topic should be reviewed for possible research when Boeing introduces its 787 
derivate, the 787-9, within the next few years.  
Conclusion 
This paper examined how to integrate globally distributed complex innovative projects by 
studying the Boeing 787 “Dreamliner” program. Whereas prior work has emphasized the need 
for collocation between partners and the formation of individual-level personal relationships to 
achieve coordination and alleviate opportunism concerns, such tools are not readily adapted to 
integrating work distributed across geographic and firm boundaries. We find that integration is 
facilitated by enhanced visibility between assembler and partners regarding the context of work 
and the locus of knowledge; we suggest that the integration tools identified in prior work 
effectively increase such visibility and argue how a dedicated integration center may increase 
visibility.  
We also find that bargaining power is important to motivating partners to take actions 
that enhance visibility across firm boundaries. Taken together, these findings imply that (1) 
enhancing visibility is the mechanism that underlies all integration efforts and (2) under 
conditions of uncertainty, authority or a close substitute, is necessary to enhance visibility and 
thereby achieve coordination even when incentives are aligned. These findings inform the lively 
debate between the transaction cost-based perspective and knowledge-based view of the firm by 
suggesting boundary conditions for the latter.   
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Figure 1: List of Boeing’s Global Supplier Partners for the 787 Airplane  
Source: Kotha and Nolan, 2005; Boeing Company. 
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Figure 2: Simplified View of Early Architectural Design for the 787 Airplane, 2004 
Source: Author’s representation of Boeing’s approach 
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Figure 3: Simplified View of the Changed Architectural Design for the 787 Airplane, 2009 
Source: Authors’ representation of Boeing’s approach 
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Figure 4: A Proposed Framework for Achieving Global Integration 
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Table 1: Integration tools available in globally disaggregated NPD projects  
 
Integration Tools Available Within 
Firm Boundaries 
Available Across 
Firm boundaries 
Available in a Globally Disaggregated 
NPD Program? 
Authority 
 
Yes No No 
Normative 
Integration 
 
Yes No No 
Relationship Specific 
Assets 
 
Yes Yes Only with partners with prior relationships* 
Social Integration Yes Yes Only with partners with prior relationships 
 
Modular 
architectures 
Yes Yes Difficult to achieve in a NPD program the 
used cutting-edge technology and a new 
approach, regardless of whether the 
activities are organized within or across 
firms. 
 
* Relationship specific assets (RSA) include things such as shared knowledge of decision-making procedures, development 
of a common language, and using shared routines and processes (Dyer and Singh, 1998). The purpose of normative 
integration is essentially to develop these same integration tools across subsidiaries of a MNE (Ghoshal and Nohria, 1989).  
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Table 2: Major Delays Announced to the 787-Program and Stated Reasons (2007-2009) 
 
Delay 
# Delay 
Announcements 
Cumulative 
delays 
Reasons for the delays as reported by Boeing and the 
discussed in the media  
1 September 2007 3 months Problems are the results of unexpected shortage of fasteners and 
inability by Spirit to deliver the forward fuselage module (see 
section #41 in Figure 1). Spirit ascribed the delays to difficulties 
in completing the software code needed for flight control 
systems by Honeywell, a Tier #2 supplier to Spirit.  
2 October 2007 
Revision 
6 months Problems were blamed on Boeing’s supply-chain network. No 
details were specified.  
3 January 2008 
Revision 
9 months Boeing blames the delay on “challenges by startup issues in 
Boeing’s factory and in factories of the extended global supply 
chain.” The focus is on supply-chain and capabilities of the 
Boeing subsidiaries and its Tier #1 partners.   
4 April 2008 
Revision* 
1 year Boeing blames the delays on problems with carbon-fiber 
technology in the center-wing box made by one of its Japanese 
partners. The media identified this partner as Kawasaki Heavy 
Industries (KHI). It was too light and needed strengthening.  
Although this was the primary responsibility of KHI. Boeing 
engineers worked on a patch to fix the early airplanes with this 
problem.  
Boeing blames “botched” assemblies of the first fuselages at 
the Charleston Vought and GA factories for the most of the 
delays.  Incomplete work transported from these factories to 
Boeing’s plant at Everett. WA played a large part in the “snafus 
that snarled the final assembly line at the Everett factory.” 
Vought in turned blamed Kawasaki for sending incomplete 
work and noted that they lacked authority to discipline KHI.  
5 December 2008 2 years Delays caused to improper work done by partners. Boeing 
had to replace improperly installed fasteners in the early 
production airplanes. The media attributed the improper fastener 
installation to “poorly written technical specifications” that 
Boeing provided partners and suppliers' lack of experience (in 
this case GA and Vought).   
Boeing is faced with at 58-day strike by the Machinists’ union at 
its final assemble plant at Everett. Machinists are unhappy with 
wage increases offered by Boeing and also unhappy with 
Boeing’s “global-partnership model,” where 787 jobs were 
outsourced. 
6 June 23, 2009 2+ years  Delays are blamed on structural flaws resulting from mating 
the wings to the fuselage of the airplane. The flaws are blamed 
on engineering issues, but no mention of who is responsible for 
the flaws. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, a Japanese partner, was 
responsible for the wings.  
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Table 3: Processes and Routines Developed at the PIC to Foster Integration 
Types of Processes  
Instituted  
Functional goal of the 
processes and routines 
Learning that resulted from 
employing the processes  
 
 
Integrating production 
A set of processes and routines 
developed to track production 
activities at Tier 1 partners.  
 
Gain greater visibility into 
partners’ activities. The 
emphasis was on problem 
diagnosis.  
   
 
Using visibility generated Boeing is able 
to surface problems before they disrupt 
the schedule. Such visibility is currently 
limited to Tier 1 partners. Boeing could 
establish PIC-like facilities at other 
factories, which should enable it to gain 
visibility into Tier 2 suppliers. 
Coordinating calls for 
assistance 
A set of routines to (1) manage 
and catalog incoming calls for 
assistance from Tier 1 
partners, (2) track and monitor 
calls. 
 
Enable partners to contact 
Boeing for expertise to help 
problem diagnosis and 
resolution. The emphasis is 
on enabling ‘knowledge’ 
visibility for partners.  
Created a sense of urgency 
on the part of PIC managers 
to resolve problems at partner 
sites.  
Using data on incoming calls, managers 
were better informed about partner 
challenges and resources they need to 
resolve problems.  
High definition video cameras provided 
rich data on the artifact and the context 
needed to make decisions. Such rich 
communications made problem 
diagnosis and resolution more 
productive.  
If certain calls were not resolved within 
a given time period, they were escalated 
to senior managers for resolution.  
Coordinating air-
transportation  
 A set of routines to manage a 
Boeing fleet (modified 747s 
airplanes) to transport 
preassembled sections. 
Assist with material flows 
among partners, and between 
Charleston and Everett. The 
emphasis is on integrating the 
supply-chain. 
As the system achieved a modicum of 
stability, the center’s primary 
responsibility shifted to managing the 
air-transportation fleet to transport 
preassembled sections from partners to 
Boeing facilities.  
Monitoring potential 
disasters 
A set of routines to 
monitor/assess events that 
could potentially disrupt the 
global supply chain.  
Predict rather than react to 
potential disruptions.  The 
focus is to ensure that 
supply-chain linkages are 
maintained through alternate 
arrangements, if needed.  
The system worked as designed. The 
PIC center keeps senior management 
and partners informed of disruptive 
situation when they happen.  
   
Managing a global partnership model 
 55 
Table 4: Integration Components and Integration Tools in the 787 Program 
 INTEGRATION COMPONENTS 
Integration Tools  DESIGN INTEGRATION PRODUCTION  
INTEGRATION 
SUPPLY-CHAIN  
INTEGRATION 
VERTICAL  
INTEGRATION 
Provides the authority needed 
to align tasks and 
responsibilities.  
Can enforce actions unilaterally to 
increase visibility of activities at 
geographically distributed facilities 
within the firm.  
 
Can enforce actions to increase 
visibility of actions to predict 
issues.  
Can modify/change scheduling 
priorities at company-owned 
facilities for smoother supply-chain 
operations. 
COLLOCATION Promotes visibility of activities 
that allows for evaluating 
interdependences between 
actors and the lead integrator. 
Promotes knowledge visibility 
to understand competencies of 
the supplier.   
Promotes visibility of activities, 
which helps the prime integrator to 
better understand partner challenges 
in carrying out the distributed tasks.  
Collocated personnel can act to 
promote knowledge visibility by 
helping partners find the required 
expertise at Boeing to resolve 
problems.  
Not used in our setting.  
 
The PIC    
Artifact based 
communication 
using high-
definition cameras 
Allows for visibility of 
activities using rich data, but 
likely to be less effective when 
cutting-edge technology 
programs are involved.  
Visibility of activities allows for 
effective problem diagnosis and 
resolution across geographies, 
“cutting days out of the problem 
solving loop”  
Could communicate the severity of 
damage (using rich data) at partner 
facilities in the wake of a natural 
disaster or help describe production 
problems (using rich data) that 
could impact the schedule.  
Resource 
(Expertise) 
mobilization  
Not applicable.   Enables the integrator to direct 
resources and expertise to solve 
problems at partner sites. Partners 
gain visibility to knowledge at 
Boeing.  
Enables integrator to direct 
resources available at Boeing to 
help the supplier manage activities 
better to resolve potential ramp-up 
problems.  
Centralization, 
prioritizing activity, 
and monitoring to 
follow-up for 
resolution 
Not applicable.  Ensures more important problems 
are resolved before smaller 
problems are tackled.   
Creates a sense of urgency at Boeing 
to respond to requests for assistance. 
Also, top management can be 
informed or looped in, if needed.  
Highlights integration needs (such 
as approvals for design changes in 
our setting).  
Ensures that schedules are 
synchronized and deliveries are 
prioritized to ensure that 
disruptions are minimized.  
Centralized tracking and 
monitoring enables effectively 
closing the loop on supply-chain 
issues.  
 
